In this paper, I argue that our ontology of art has undergone a major change in the course of modern history. While we currently think of artworks as parts arranged in a certain way, there was a time when artworks were thought of as metaphysically more akin to ordinary artifacts such as tables and chairs; that is, as wholes having replaceable parts. This change in our ontology of art is reflected in our approach to art restoration. But what explains the change? I will suggest that the change took place because of a change in our conception of the function of art. More specifically, I will suggest that we have started to think of artworks as parts arranged in a certain way, because we have started to think of artworks as having, primarily, an aesthetic function.
The Ontology of Art: Artifactualism, Relativism, and Fictionalism
Amie Thomasson proposes the artifactual theory of art. According to the theory, works of art are artifacts, so our beliefs and practices regarding works of art determine facts about the ontology of art. In this paper, I raise two objections to the artifactual theory of art: the law of contradiction objection and the law of bivalence objection. I then propose a new theory that captures intuitive ideas underlying the artifactual theory and yet avoids these objections. Finally, I argue that the new theory successfully deals with the paradox of the ontology of music.
In this talk I will explore some of the several senses of ‘version’ (and its cognates) in an art-ontological context, my primary goal being to identify some ways in which works of art can be usefully classified and appreciated as versions. One noteworthy sub-category of versions will be illustrated with reference to Edvard Munch’s various works entitled ‘Skrik’ (The Scream). Previous elucidations of ‘version’ proposed by Stephen Davies and Nelson Goodman will also be considered.